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Abstract—In the software design, protecting a computer system
from a plethora of software attacks or malware in the wild
has been increasingly important. One branch of research to
detect the existence of attacks or malware, there has been much
work focused on modeling the runtime behavior of a program.
Stemming from the seminal work of Forrest et al., one of the
main tools to model program behavior is system call sequences.
Unfortunately, however, since mimicry attacks were proposed,
program behavior models based solely on system call sequences
could no longer ensure the security of systems and require
additional information that comes with its own drawbacks. In
this paper, we report our preliminary findings in our research
to build a mimicry resilient program behavior model that has
lesser drawbacks. We employ branch sequences to harden
our program behavior model against mimicry attacks while
employing hardware features for efficient extraction of such
branch information during program runtime. In order to han-
dle the large scale of branch sequences, we also employ LSTM,
the de facto standard in deep learning based sequence modeling
and report our preliminary experiments on its interaction with
program branch sequences.
1. Introduction
Protecting a computer system from a plethora of soft-
ware attacks or malware in the wild has been increasingly
important. Although the nature or cause of an attack is often
hard to know in practice, it usually results in anomalous be-
havior different from what can be seen in a normal program
during execution. The rationale behind this argument is that
in the case of attacks, to infiltrate a system, attackers usually
gain control over program execution exploiting exposed
vulnerabilities, which resultantly produces different program
behavior from that of benign programs. Following this logic,
as one branch of research to detect the existence of attacks
or malware, there has been much work focused on modeling
the runtime behavior of a program [9], [11], [14], [16], [21],
[24], [25], [26], [28], [29]. This is done by either modeling
the behavior of normal program execution in order to detect
attacks that cause anomalies or modeling the behavior of
known malware families to detect similar malware.
Stemming from the seminal work of Forrest et al. [4],
one of the main tools to model program behavior is system
call sequences. As stated in [4], for most malware or
attacks to function correctly, they must access system re-
sources which are only accessible through system calls to the
OS. Therefore, we could model the system call sequences
representing such accesses in order to discern malicious
activity or we could model the expected normal system call
sequences of a system and discern any anomalous sequence
that does not follow the model to be potentially malicious.
Unfortunately, since mimicry attacks [20], [27], which
hide malicious system call sequences by mimicking that of
benign programs, were proposed, program behavior models
based solely on system call sequences could no longer
ensure the security of systems. In order to counter mimicry
attacks, researchers aimed to include additional information,
such as system call arguments [17], [18] or call stack infor-
mation [3], that could help build a program behavior model
capable of differentiating true normal system call sequences
from mimicked system call sequences. However, the inclu-
sion of additional information brings its own drawbacks. For
instance, unlike system call sequences that could be easily
modeled automatically via various sequence based machine
learning methods, system call arguments come in many
different forms and require complex handcrafted constraints
or augmentations to model every different type of argument.
While this makes it capable of leveraging human intuition,
it also leaves it susceptible to human error.
Therefore, in this paper, we report our preliminary find-
ings in our research to build a mimicry resilient program
behavior model that does not suffer from the drawbacks
of prior work. As, during our preliminary studies, we have
found that no-op system calls [27], which are the main
tool of building mimicry attacks, are easily discernible with
the help of branch traces, We employ branch sequences to
harden our program behavior model against mimicry attacks.
With the help of recent hardware features, Intel Processor
Tracing (PT) [15] on Intel x64 architectures and real-time
trace macrocells (ETM, PTM, STM) in ARM architectures,
we can acquire branch sequences of a running program
with low overhead. Furthermore, branch traces magnify
any anomalies in a corresponding system call trace as an
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Figure 1. Architectural overview of the DeePBM framework.
anomalous system call would bring with it many anomalous
branch instructions. However, by employing branch traces,
the possible number of candidates for each element in a
sequence are several orders of magnitude larger than that
of system call sequences. Due to this fact, most system
call sequence modeling methods proposed in prior work
would not work well with branch traces. In order to address
this, we leverage deep learning, more specifically Long
Short Term Memory (LSTM) [10], to handle large scale
sequence modeling. LSTM shows great success in various
sequence modeling applications and could be considered the
current de facto standard for deep learning based sequence
modeling. Our preliminary experiments show it has great
promise in branch sequence modeling. Based on these, we
design a prototype system, DeePBM which leverages Intel
PT to acquire and deliver branch sequences for the training
and inference of an LSTM based program behavior model.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. First we
give a brief overview of the design of our prototype system
DeePBM and our LSTM branch model in Section 2. Then
we report our preliminary findings in modeling program
branch sequences with LSTM in Section 3. Finally, we
conclude our paper in Section 4.
2. Prototype Design
The ultimate goal of DeePBM is to support an LSTM
branch model with an efficient runtime mechanism that can
record all the branch outcomes produced during program
execution and deliver them to the model. In this section, we
describe the overall architecture of DeePBM.
2.1. Components of DeePBM
Logging module (LM) keeps track of execution paths
of the live target process, gathering through PT its branch
traces generated by the CPU. LM aims to capture the
complete behavior of the target process by collecting branch
traces from both user mode and kernel mode. In addition, if
the process forks a child process during execution, LM will
be immediately configured to monitor it as well.
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Figure 2. Branch model
As a hardware extension to support control flow tracing,
PT generates branch traces in the form of several encoded
data packets including Taken Not-Taken (TNT) packets,
Target IP (TIP) packets, and Flow Update packets (FUP).
TNT indicates the direction of direct conditional branches
and represent the information about returns. TIP records the
target address of control transfers such as indirect jumps
and indirect calls. FUP provides the source address for
asynchronous events such as those triggering interrupts. In
the current implementation, LM gathers the traces of branch
target addresses from TNT and TIP packets.
Deep learning engine (DLE) consists of two modules
each for training and inference, respectively. Under a con-
trolled environment for learning program behavior, the train-
ing module performs four types of operations belonging to
the training phase of our deep learning model. One operation
is dividing available branch traces either into the training
set or validation set. Another is transforming branch traces
into an input-friendly form for model training, which will be
described in Section 2.2. The remaining two are training the
model with the training set and validating the model with
the validation set. In our implementation, these operations
are repeated as many times as needed. The inference module
performs two types of operations belonging to the inference
phase of the model. One is transforming the given branch
trace into an input-friendly form for inference. The other
is detecting anomalies or patterns in the given branch trace
with the trained branch model and reporting the result. In
Section 2.2, we will discuss the deep learning model trained
and managed by DLE.
2.2. LSTM branch model
As typical processes in modern programs execute long
chains of branches, the number of branches required to
fully understand the meaning of program behavior is quite
large. In addition, the branches comprising a process are
intertwined with each other in a complicated way. In this
regard, learning long-term dependence is crucial for devising
effective program behavior models. Therefore, we employ
long short term memory (LSTM) [10], a well-designed RNN
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architecture component that has the capability of capturing
long term dependencies, as the basis of our DLE.
Figure 2 illustrates the architecture of the branch model,
that is, our language model of branch sequences, which
estimates the probability distribution of the next branch in
a sequence given the sequence of previous branch events.
Let vocabulary V be the set of all possible branch target
addresses. Then, each branch target address is indexed by an
integer starting from 1 to K = |V |. However, in general, it is
hard to know all possible branch target addresses beforehand
and they are not fixed. To deal with this issue, we build
a vocabulary that consists of the top K − 1 most frequent
addresses and a single special address, unknown, which rep-
resents all the other addresses. Let x = x1x2 · · ·xl(xi ∈ V )
denote a sequence of l branches.
At the input layer, the branch at each time step xi is fed
into the model in the form of one-hot encoding, in other
words, a K dimensional vector with all elements zero except
position xi. At the embedding layer, incoming branches are
embedded to continuous space by multiplying embedding
matrix W , which should be learned. At the hidden layer, the
LSTM unit has an internal state, and this state is updated
recurrently at each time step. At the output layer, a softmax
activation function is used to produce the estimation of nor-
malized probability values of possible branches coming next
in the sequence, P (xi|x1:i−1). According to the chain rule,
we can estimate the sequence probability by the following
formula:
P (x) =
l∏
i=1
P (xi|x1:i−1) (1)
Given training branch sequence data, we can train
this LSTM-based branch model using the backpropagation
through time (BPTT) algorithm. The training criterion min-
imizes the cross-entropy loss, which is equivalent to max-
imizing the likelihood of the branch sequence. A standard
RNN often suffers from the vanishing/exploding gradient
problem, and when training with BPTT, gradient values
tend to blow up or vanish exponentially. This makes it
difficult to learn long-term dependency in RNNs [1]. LSTM
is equipped with an explicit memory cell and tends to be
more effective to cope with this problem. Given a new query
branch sequence, on the assumption that attack/malware
branch patterns deviate from normal patterns, a sequence
with a perplexity, an average negative log-likelihood prob-
ability, above a threshold could be considered to not be
likely of what is learned by the model. In other words,
a sequence that shows high perplexity in a branch model
of a malware family is probably not associated with that
particular malware type.
3. Preliminary findings
In this section, we share our findings during our prelim-
inary studies and experiments. We first explore the inherent
resilience branch sequences offer against mimicry attacks.
Then we share our experiments in employing DeePBM to
Figure 3. Initial branch sequence of system call open()
learn the normal behaviors of programs in order to detect
any attacks against those programs.
3.1. Branch sequences and Mimicry attacks
Mimicry attacks [20], [27] were originally proposed to
defeat solutions that only rely on system call sequences.
In [27], a handcrafted mimicry attack sequence is given
by transforming an existing attack to emit a system call
sequence that would be viewed as a normal sequence by ex-
isting work. The transformation relies on no-op system calls
which can be made in such a way that it would not affect
anything, such as calling mkdir() with an invalid pointer,
to hide the system call footprints of the malicious code.
This technique would nullify program behavior modeling
solutions that only monitor system calls, and subsequently
necessitates supplementary data in order to differentiate no-
op system calls between normal system calls. During our
preliminary experimentation we have found that by simply
examining branch sequences, which would be counted as
using supplementary data in addition to system calls, we
were able to isolate no-op calls from normal ones when
the branch sequences following system calls diverge even
though the system calls are of the same type. For example,
Figure 3 shows the initial 27 branches when an open()
system call is made. As can be seen, the sequence of a
normal call and that of a no-op call diverges from the 23rd
branch. After the shown branches, the normal system call
goes through 364 branches handling opening the file, while
the no-op call goes through 159 branches handling errors
stemming from trying to use a null pointer. This trend can be
seen through most no-op system calls, as they leverage null
or invalid pointers to render system calls void. Therefore,
we would be able to discover system call sequence mimicry
attacks in past literature. However theoretically, any program
behavior modeling solution including ours is susceptible
to new mimicry attacks crafted to forge mimic sequence
patterns similar to those of call/branch sequences accepted
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Figure 4. The ROC curves and perplexity of each Program. ProFTPD and DOP share the same normal sequence in this figure.
to be normal by its existing model [23]. The key issue is how
much leeway is left for adversaries to maneuver. Solutions
that examine more detailed information leave less room for
new mimicry attacks. This is another benefit of operating
on branch sequences, that is, the most detailed information
which is efficiently available. Though theoretically there still
might exist mimicry attacks that would not be detectable by
branch models, the expressiveness of such attacks would be
severely limited as it will be hard to find necessary no-op
branches. Therefore, we believe in practice that it would
be considerably difficult to build mimicry attacks to avoid
detection from program branch models.
3.2. Branch sequence model for anomaly detection
We trained branch models on three separate real pro-
grams: MySQL, Nagios and ProFTPD [2], [19], [22]. These
applications were mainly selected as they were the target
victims of four publicly available attacks: privilege esca-
lation via CVE-2016-6663 and CVE-2016-6664 [5], [6]
against MySQL, privilege escalation via CVE-2016-9565
and CVE-2016-9566 [7], [8] against Nagios and address
leakage attack and data-oriented programming (DOP) attack
via CVE-2006-5815 [12], [13].
The lower row of Figure 4 depicts the ROC curves and
perplexity of sequences collected for inference. This shows
how our branch model regards the collected sequences.
As can be seen, the model is quite capable of discerning
between the normal and attack sequences. The perplexity
for the normal sequences are quite low, meaning that they
conform to what our model has learned from the training
datasets. On the other hand, nearly all sequences containing
attacks show high perplexity, which would mean the branch
sequences deviate from what our model expected. For a few
normal sequences, the model reports high perplexity. With
further examination, we believe this is due to the sequences
containing rare events, such as one of the Nagios monitored
computers crashing, that were not covered by the training
data. This could also be seen that our model can successfully
interpret branch sequences of such events as an anomaly in
program behavior. As seen in the upper row of Figure 4, the
overall detection performance of DeePBM’s trained models
are reflected in their ROC curves. The models can achieve
high detection rate with low false positive rates on modern
server programs.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we have shared our preliminary findings
on applying LSTM to branch sequences in order to model
program behavior. We believe our work has provided a
glimpse of evidence that can demonstrate the feasibility
of deep learning models employed for program behavior
modeling via LSTM and branch sequences. We have also
briefly explored the possibility of mimicry attack mitigation
through the nature of branch sequences and believe when
leveraged well, branch information could provide an effi-
cient way of mimicry mitigation.
As an extension of our work, we are currently looking
into modeling malware families through branch sequences
and testing its viability in finding similar mutated malware
samples as well as testing our work against actual working
mimicry malware.
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